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DISASTER AT WHITE TAIL:
THE FORT SILL APACHES' FIRST TEN YEARS
AT MESCALERO, 1913-1923
JOHN A. TURCHENESKE

the early morning hours of Friday, April 4, 1913, the
Rock Island Railway special train bearing 163 Chiricahua Apache
prisoners of war rumbled south toward the Sacramento Mountains as it skirted past the Valley of the Fires' eastern rim. As the
train slowly crawled to a halt in the sleepy New Mexico hamlet of
Tularosa, the twenty-seven-year period of captivity experienced
by a number of these Indians came to an end. I In 1886, charged
with allegedly abetting Geronimo and his fellow belligerents, the
military uprooted these particular individuals from their San
Carlos and Fort Apache, Arizona homes. In point of fact, none of
those Chiricahuas removed to Fort Marion, Florida and subsequently transferred to Mount Vernon Barracks, Alabama in 1887
were guilty of armed insurrection. For reasons of political expediency none would ever be returned to Arizona.
Younger members of this forlorn band had been born into captivity while the Chiricahuas were held for twenty years at Fort
Sill, Oklahoma, from which all of these Indians had come. Generally known as the Fort Sill Apaches, the Chiricahuas were about
to be amalgamated with the Mescalero Apaches. Shortly after
detraining, Major George W. Goode, their officer in charge,
returned these Indians to the Interior Department's jurisdiction,
thus officially releasing the Chiricahuas from their odious status
as prisoners of war. 2 Their reputation somewhat altered by a prolonged period of confinement, the Chiricahuas, in the custody of
agent Clarence R. Jefferis, journeyed to the Mescalero Indian
Reservation as the "best bunch of Indians in the country."3
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Yet the Chiricahuas did not necessarily share the moment's euphoria, for their odyssey to New Mexico was born of desperation.
When the Chiricahuas were removed from Alabama to Fort Sill in
1894, they were promised freedom and permanent allotment at
that installation "if they behaved themselves."4 Consequently,
scrupulously avoiding breaches of discipline, they conscientiously
adhered to their captors' program of civilization and diligently
labored to place themselves in an economic position to handle
such allotments. Contrary to one Indian Office operative's observation that allotment of Mescaleros would provide a salutary example for the Fort Sill Apaches,s the Chiricahuas, at the time of
their removal from Fort Sill, were basically self-sufficient and able
to make their way in the white man's world if properly supported
by the Indian Bureau. They had become experienced cattlemen
with approximately 10,500 head of high grade Herefords worth
well over $300,000. Had Fort Sill been abandoned and given over
to the Chiricahuas as originally intended, these Indians in time
would have become one of Oklahoma's wealthiest tribes. 6
Yet promises of permanent homes, allotment and freedom at
Fort Sill were never realized. By 1903 military officials decided to
retain Fort Sill for future artillery training. Geronimo's demise in
1909 eradicated most of the opposition emanating from New Mexico to Chiricahua resettlement in that territory. With this obstacle
finally removed, War Department personnel were easily enabled
by instilling fear, suspicion and deep despair among the Chiricahuas that they would never receive Fort Sill as earlier promised
them, to convince most of these Indians that relocation to Mescalero would be in their best interest. Relentlessly pressured by the
military to make this decision, those Chiricahuas, too weak to
withstand such onslaughts and longing for freedom and a home to
call their own, eventually clamored for resettlement at Mescalero.
There immediately ensued a four-year acrimonious struggle between the War and Interior Departments over which settlement
policies would be pursued. Although Interior's efforts to maintain
the Chiricahuas at Fort Sill came to naught, in the compromise
agreement which followed, that Department's Indian rights activist allies 7 exacted a guarantee that those Chiricahuas choosing
Mescalero as their new home would be placed in as good an eco-
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nomic condition as they had known at Fort Sill. 8 Tragically, this
pledge was also to remain unfulfilled. What befell those Chiricahuas who came to New Mexico during their subsequent ten-year
period of severe impoverishment at the Mescalero Indian Reservation amply demonstrates why, removal importunities to the contrary, the Fort Sill Apaches had every reason to question whether
the latest promises made them regarding their well-being at Mescalero would come to pass. 9 Developments which unfolded after
their arrival in New Mexico would also illustrate why, in reality,
many of these Indians hated to leave and were apprehensive of
departing Fort Sill, as well as why they never considered themselves truly free 10 upon release from their status as prisoners of
war, and why they regretted coming to Mescalero. II
Initially, at least, these Indians' friends cautiously expressed optimism over the Chiricahuas' future at Mescalero. Missionaries of
the Reformed Church in America believed that Fort Sill Apaches'
release from captivity was an event of great import. 12 Echoing this
view, members of the Board of Indian Commissioners believed the
Chiricahuas' resettlement at Mescalero was transacted "in a manner highly creditable to the Government." This move provided a
means for these Indians' proper civilization and development. At
the same time, Board members urged Indian Office personnel to
exert every effort to develop the Chiricahuas' sense of independence and responsibility and "prevent anything like a backward industrial tendency or a going back from individualistic to tribal
customs. "13
Slightly over a month after the Chiricahuas' arrival in New
Mexico, Major Goode returned to Mescalero for a six-day tour of
inspection relative to the progress made by his furmer charges. His
report sounded a note of caution. While Goode found them cheerful and orderly, they as yet had not been settled in any permanent
location on the reservation. Rather, they continued to be encamped at the agency headquarters, and thus were most inte'rested
in being finally situated at their new homes. Goode believed they
could best be satisfied and encouraged by being so located with as
little delay as possible. Since Mescalero afforded a fine cattle
range, their money should be invested in stock. "In their present
frame of mind," said Goode, these Indians would continue to pro-
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gress if encouraged and given the opportunity. Were the Chiricahuas "discouraged by delays or failure to realize their hopes they
will drift back into old vicious habits, and become worthless and
troublesome." One way to accomplish the objectives set for the
Fort Sill Apaches was to allow agent Jefferis a free hand in the administration of these Indians' affairs by exempting him from Indian Office regulations which might hamper such management. l '
On the other hand, there were reports of a more propitious nature. Prior to the Chiricahuas' removal to Mescalero, New Mexico's Senators Albert B. Fall and Thomas B. Catron and their
stockmen constituents opposed such transfer. Ostensibly, their
protests were based on a fear of renewed Apache hostilities. Actually, these maneuvers were designed to protect their reservation
grazing leases. ls Fortunately, no reports of "open outbreak of hostilities between the Indians and white settlers as was alleged to be
feared by New Mexican politicians and cattlemen" came from
Mescalero. 16
Evidence soon surfaced that such fears were absolutely without
foundation. "From all accounts," said Brigadier General Hugh L.
Scott, the "only dissatisfied people over the situation are Senators
Fall and Catron." Actually, New Mexico as a whole cared nothing
"about the matter one way or another. . . . Far from deluging
this country once more in blood as we used to read in the Senatorial screeds last fall," Scott said, the Chiricahuas were "looking
for some baseball club to tread on their coattails when the only
blood likely to flow would be that of the umpire." 17
In mid-May, the first battle the Chiricahuas found themselves
engaged in since their arrival at Mescalero was a baseball contest
held in Cloudcroft with that city's team. According to the sports
columnist for the Weekly Cloudcrofter, the game was an "easy
victory for the Indians, the score standing 22 to 2 in their favor."
Continuing, the columnist noted that "numerous errors on the
part of the Cloudcroft team were responsible for the defeat." Actually, the "Fort Sill boys romped around the diamond and ran
scores while some of the Cloudcroft boys were trying to put the
ball somewhere-just where was not always plain." Goodwill was
further manifested since "no one wanted to 'kill the umpire' or
scalp anybody," and thus the "game passed off pleasantly."
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Reports were that the "visitors expressed themselves as being
highly pleased with the courteous treatment shown them while
here and no doubt they will be back again."IB Referring to the
Chiricahuas' return engagement in July, Scott observed that such
a felicitous outcome directly contradicted Fall's predictions of
renewed carnage in New Mexico and Arizona. 19
Yet for all this, the Chiricahuas faced serious difficulties, many
of which would not be resolved for decades. By September, for example, these Indians had still to be permanently placed in their
new homes in the reservation's White Tail Canyon district.
Located approximately twenty miles northeast of the Mescalero
Agency, White Tail was a narrow eight-mile-long valley over
seven thousand feet in elevation which periodically suffered severe
winter cold, heavy snowfalls, late and early frosts and occasional
spring and summer droughts. As a reason for placing the Chiricahuas at this site, Jefferis advised his superiors that White Tail was
the only area on the reservation that remained unoccupied. As
matters stood, wells for drinking water, stock tanks, roads and
houses were only partially constructed, and in some cases not even
begun. Also, the Chiricahuas were unable to take advantage of the
current growing season. Only now was ground being broken on an
extremely limited amount of arable land which was not subject to
irrigation. Even then, since the period in which crops' could be
made was of short'duration, all that might be raised were small
grains and vegetables. 20
In this regard, Jefferis sounded an ominous note. It would be absolutely impossible for the Chiri~ahuas to sustain themselves
economically solely on agriculturaifmrsuits. Their major source
of income would have to be realized from a prospective cattle industry, which the government had a definite moral and legal obligation to fund initially. As such, Jefferis and his successors would
continuously plead for just such a program. Were the government
not desirous of providing the necessary monies outright for this
purpose, then a loan could be made using the reservation's timber
resources as collateral. In this way, both Mescaleros and the Fort
Sill Apaches would be highly benefitted. 2 1
Another serious difficulty which confronted Jefferis and his successors was the matter of those monies belonging to the Chirica-
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Map of the Mescalero Reservation, showing the relationship of the White Tail
Allotment to the reservation and to Ruidoso. Courtesy the National Archives and
Records Center.
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huas, which by mutual War and Interior Department agreement
were to redound to both tribes' benefit. Contrary to Goode's expectations,the Indian Office rigidly regulated Jefferis' administration of the Chiricahuas' funds. 22 Fortunately for these Indians,
after several months' delays they received their individual shares
in the $171,172.03 realized as their portion of those proceeds accruing from the recent sale of the Chiricahuas' cattle herd at Fort
Sill,23 Yet there still remained the matter of the General Apache
Fund, totalling nearly $30,000, which was to be made available
for purchase of cattle for both Mescaleros and Fort Sill Apaches
relocated in New Mexico. 24 Tragically, there is no extant evidence
that these monies were ever turned over to the Mescaleros for this
purpose, a situation which only compounded the problem of establishing them on an economically viable plane of existence.
While the Chiricahuas patiently awaited what had been promised them at Mescalero,25 an obstacle of a more sinister nature
lurked on the horizon. Still angered by the Fort Sill Apaches'
removal to New Mexico, Senator Fall vigorously renewed his campaign to turn the Mescalero Indian Reservation into a national
park. 26 In addition to protecting friends' and relatives' grazing
leases at this location, Fall's latest covert purpose in pressing this
issue was to obtain rights and royalties on minerals extracted at
Mescalero. Mary W. Roe, a Reformed Church missionary, advised
Edgar B. Meritt of the Indian Office that Fall would never rest until he met with success in this matter. 27
According to Major Goode, favorable action on Fall's national
park scheme would be a crime against the Chiricahuas and Mescaleros. Were the Indian Office to carry out its obligations to both
tribal groups and properly develop the reservation, they would
"be well off and prosperous in a few years." These Indians would
be ruined if Fall's bill became law. "On whatever pretext white
men are permitted to get a foothold on the Mescalero reservation,
no matter how fair sounding may be the terms of the provision
granting it, the fact will be a menace to their rights" and the initial step will have been "taken in what will eventually be their undoing." Goode urged friends of the Indian to prevent this from
happening. 28
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Shortly, Goode would have additional words of caution on the
Fort Sill Apaches' situation at Mescalero. In the company of
General Scott, Goode arrived at the reservation on October 8 for
the purpose of observing conditions which confronted the Chiricahuas. Goode advised U.S. Indian Commissioner Cato Sells that
many of these Indians appeared "satisfied with the prospect ahead
of them" but expressed impatience over delays in meeting their
immediate needs, especially on the issue of clothing, a commodity
which they desperately needed. Only thirty families were assigned
farms at White Tail and cunstruction on twenty-five houses had
yet to be commenced. Families not yet located at White Tail
would have to remain at the agency and live in tents during the
winter. These could not possibly be relocated until summer.
Scott shared with Goode "great confidence in the ultimate success and prosperity of these Indians," provided they were "established under such favorable conditions as are obviously possible at
this time; and with as little further delay as possible." To ensure
their economic well-being, Goode urged that the range be stocked
with cattle and that an adequate water supply be developed using
wells and tanks. Health facilities were needed to treat pneumonia.
In order to meet these needs, Jefferis needed the Indian Office's
support and a free hand in the administration of reservation affairs. Goode strongly hinted that "prompt action now in developing conditions at Mescalero will meet with response from the Indians which will bring success and prosperity to these people."
Otherwise, continued delay would only "discourage them and
engender discontent with attendant evils, and make the task of the
superintendent very difficult, if not impossible. "29
Writing to Colonel Edwin St. John Greble immediately thereafter, the sense of urgency expressed by Goode for his former
charges was somewhat stronger. Reiterating the points covered in
his letter to Sells, Goode explained that his object in requesting
Scott to accompany him to Mescalero was to make the Chiricahuas "feel that the War Department was interested in them-to
reassure them and give them encouragement, notwithstanding the
delays which tend to make them restless." Yet Goode wished it
were "possible to impress upon the Commissioner," whom he
believed was "much interested in these Indians," how important it
was to achieve "results at Mescalero with as little additional delay
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as possible." Were the Chiricahuas "to back-slide, because of
delay in developing conditions they have been waiting for, their
demoralization will be very rapid; the whole Mescalero tribe will
be affected, and the superintendent will be up against a hard proposition." Such would not come to pass if the reservation was wellstocked with cattle, for there would "be plain sailing; and those
Indians will be self-supporting and prosperous in a few years. "30
Greble, who was instrumental in establishing the field artillery
school at Fort Sill, the construction of which finally forced the
Chiricahuas off the installation, immediately transmitted Goode's
communication to Major General Leonard Wood, U.S. Army
Chief of Staff. Wood, who had held this position since 1910 and
had been directly involved in suppressing the last of Geronimo's
belligerancies in 1886,31 requested the Interior Secretary to bring
this urgent matter to Sells' attention. Sells, said Wood, should
exert "special effort. . . to comply as promptly as possible with
the promises made the Indians who went to Mescalero; that is,
that they would be settled upon farms and be given an opportunity
to earn a living, and that they would be rationed, clothed and sheltered until they had an opportunity to realize upon their first
crops. "32
Interior's reply failed to assure interested military personnel
that arrangements made by both departments for the benefit of
those Chiricahuas who relocated at Mescalero were being fulfilled
properly. War Department officials learned that only blankets and
shoes were authorized for shipment and that other matters pertaining to the Fort Sill Apaches "are being handled as expeditiously as possible."33 Upon being informed of Interior's response,
Major Goode observed that the "Indian Office has gingered up a
little." Goode hoped "they will do the right thing by Jefferis and
give him a chance to work out that proposition at Mescalero."34
Goode's expectation in this regard was not to be realized. Attempting to facilitate Chiricahua resettlement at White Tail, Jefferis begged Indian Office superiors in January 1914, for farm
machinery, housing appliances, an increase of beef and other food
rations and adequate hospital facilities. 35 Reformed Church missionaries believed the Chiricahuas' future at Mescalero was uncertain since provisions for their permanent establishment were
either slow or "constantly deferred. "36 Matters became even more
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The Fort Sill Apaches' baseball team. Courtesy the U.S. Army Field Artillery and Fort Sill
Museum.

00

TURCHENESKE: FORT SILL APACHES

119

uncertain when Senator Fall reintroduced his measure to tum
Mescalero into a natiorial park. 37
Vigorously protesting this move, Father William H. Ketcham,
S.J., a member of the Board of Indian Commissioners, urged upon
completion of his January 1914 visit to Mescalero that an appropriation sufficient to establish both Mescaleros and Chiricahuas in
the cattle raising business be allocated these Indians so they might
become economically self-sustaining. 38 Jefferis concurred with this
view and further observed that the Indian Office's efforts in this
direction were substantially lacking. 39 Since it was "obvious to
anyone that an Indian cannot make his living from a tract of
land" which did not exceed fifteen acres for each individual, Jefferis advocated stocking Mescalero, which contained "one of the
finest . . . ranges in the country," with a minimum of twelve
thousand head of cattle. Furthermore, if white permittees, whose
leases had not yet been extinguished as earlier proposed, were
making substantial profits from their sheep and cattle interests,
then "why shouldn't the Indians' grass be eaten by Indian cattle
and the profits therefrom accrue to the Indians?"40
An appropriation of $200,000 would provide a good beginning
for their cattle industry.41 If necessary, Jefferis suggested, these
and additional monies required for this purpose could be allocated
on a loan basis, "to be secured by the timber on the reservation,
which is valued at three and a half million dollars. "42 Stocking of
the reservation with cattle, said Jefferis, "was cited as one of the
advantages that would be enjoyed by the Fort Sills who elected to
remove to Mescalero." These Indians came to New Mexico anticipating a prosperous future inasmuch as they left Oklahoma with
the "full expectation of being just as well, if not better, situated."
Jefferis wondered what their feeling might be "when they find that
all there is for them here is a small piece 6f farm land which, work
as hard as they may, cannot be made to produce enough to keep
them and their families in food and clothing." Were Congress not
to provide even a reimbursable appropriation with which to stock
Mescalero with cattle, Jefferis could not see "what is to become of
them."43
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Holding a similar view of the situation, James Mooney, the
noted ethnologist, definitely believed the Chiricahuas were removed to the wrong place. 44 They were, said Mooney, making a
new beginning under adverse conditions and in "forced companionship with people, who although cognate, are their hereditary
enemies." Mooney believed that the only logical location for these
people was in Arizona. Since their fighting days were long over,
and many were already of the second generation, Mooney was
skeptical that the government could not relocate "fifty families in
their native environment. "45
Had the Chiricahuas been given the opportunity to decide
whether to relocate in Arizona, Mooney believed most of these Indians would have desired to make such a move. As matters stood,
said Mooney, "we see a decimated remnant officially cut off from
their own kindred and further cut into two parts, each to continue
as aliens in a strange land and among unsympathetic people and
more or less hostile surroundings." Thus, rather than eliminate" a
problem we have cr~ated an additional one." Furthermore,
Mooney contended, history aptly demonstrated that tribal entities
were able to "preserve' their vitality and existence only in large
bodies." Since the Mescaleros were both a small and dispirited
people and "far behind the Chiricahuas in present advancement,"
their contact with the Fort Sill Apaches would prove severely
detrimental to this group. Were the Chiricahuas returned to
Arizona among related peoples, their prospects of survival would
be increased measurably. Should they be forced to remain in New
Mexico "with their small body and loss of faith in Government,"
they would be unable to "withstand the shock."46
In this vein, despite the heavy summer rains which promised
fairly successful crops,41 Jefferis reiterated his plea for funds with
which to stock Mescalero with cattle, inasmuch as the "returns
from crops produced on fifteen acres of land will be inadequate to
support the average Indian family. "48 Although initial indications
regarding endeavors to include the $200,000 reimbursable cattle
item in the fiscal 1915 Indian appropriation bill pointed toward
success, upon further inquiry Jefferis learned that this measure
failed to pass. 49 Instead, Jefferis would have to meet all of Mescalero's industrial needs out of a $75,000 lump sum appropriation
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allocated for this purpose. 50 This would allow the cattle business
to commence on a somewhat meager basis "with the result that
the first three years will be lean ones, so far as the Indians are concerned." Jefferis hoped the time would come when the Mescalero
Cattle Company herds numbered at least twelve thousand head in
order that "three full meals a day" for these Indians would be the
rule instead of the exception."51
Were ensuing developments any indication, Jefferis's hope was
not to be realized for some time to come. By mid-October 1914 the
Indian Office stopped rationing the Chiricahuas. Asa Daklugie,
who led the pro-Mescalero removal faction, believed his people
were not yet ready for such action. According to Daklugie, anywhere from three to five years of continued rationing was
necessary until the Fort Sill Apaches made an adequate beginning
in the cattle industry as well as improving their farmland. Besides,
as Daklugie viewed the situation, the government had a responsibility toward placing the Chiricahuas on an adequate plan of
economic self-sufficiency. 52
As if the matter of extinguished rations was not difficulty
enough, in mid-October, after six weeks without rain, a substantial portion of the Chiricahuas' oat crop was devastated by fire.
Shortly thereafter, numerous and heavy snowfalls punctuated the
remaining fall and early winter seasons. 53 This circumstance
made threshing of the Chiricahuas' crop nearly impossible.
Although several families managed to complete this task, by the
early spring of 1915 much of the crop was "still out in the fields."
Were the elements to force this situation to continue, the Chiricahuas would be prevented from planting their fields in time to salvage a harvest in late summer. 54
Another discouragement which presented itself was the matter
of housing. By the spring of 1915 housing construction for the
Chiricahuas located at White Tail had not been completed.
Homes which already had been erected were of poor quality. Incensed at yet another injustice inflicted upon the Fort Sill
Apaches, James O. Arthur, Reformed Church missionary to both
the Chiricahuas and Mescaleros, observed that "when the high
winds from the west" come "sweeping down the canyon, every
crack and knot-hole is discovered to admit the cooling breeze." A
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Above: Asa Daklugie, leader of the pro-Mescalero removal faction. Courtesy the
U.S. Army Artillery and Fort Sill Museum. Below: First housing at White Tail.
Courtesy the Smithsonian Institution.
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number of the houses were a "disgrace to the white men who are
responsible for their erection," Homes were "built upon wooden
posts for a foundation," and constructed "of lumber that went
from the standing tree to the carpenters' hands in a month's time,
so green that the sap oozed out with every nail driven into it."
When these dwellings finally dried out, floors, irside ceilings and
walls became surfeited with cracks such that "the knots drop out
of the boards," This situation made Arthur "warm under the collar every time" he visited the Chiricahuas' homes, viewed the
finished product and remembered that sufficient funds were appropriated "to have built a really respectable home under efficient
management. "55 Similar disgust with such circumstances caused
Asa Daklugie to lose confidence in Jefferis and call for a new
agent. 56
Jefferis's resignation on November IS, 1915 failed to have an
appreciable impact upon the Indians at Mescalero, So despondent
had some of the Fort Sill Apaches become that in early January
1916 several Chiricahuas were involved in a serious altercation
with Tularosa law enforcement authorities which resulted in
severe injuries. J. W, Prude, the trader at Mescalero who advised
General Senft of these incidents, strongly urged that former agent
James A, Carroll, in whom the Indians had confidence, be returned to this reservation without delay. Were this not to happen
then future episodes of a similar nature "would be a sweet morsel
in the mouth of, . . Senator Fall" so as to enable him to "criticize
those who were instrumental in getting the Fort Sill Apaches"
relocated ih New Mexico,57
Despite such timely warnings, Fall wasted no time in attempting to utilize this "sweet morse!" to good advantage. On January
5, J 916, he reintroduced legislation which would make Mescalero
a national park, Protesting the potential loss for these Indians of
their mineral, land, timber and hunting rights, Richard Henry
Harper, who initially established the Reformed Church's mission
at this reservation, asked whether such action was just. "Shall a
great Government like ours, in this enlightened age of the world,
deal thus with a helpless people?" Harper believed that "such
treatment of the weak by the strong in other days-and in some
countries today-would be called barbaric." Harper wondered
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whether it would be "less so if practiced by the people of the
United States."58 Also advocating defeat of Fall's endeavors in this
direction, William A. Light, the new agent at Mescalero, believed
the Indians' rights to this reservation should belong to them and
"their descendants 'as long as the sun shines and the water
runs.' "59
In this respect, Light especially emphasized the need to develop
more fully these Indians' cattle business. Light's predecessor
managed to purchase twelve hundred head of Herefords from the
$75,000 allocated to Mescalero for industrial purposes. At the
same time, the Chiricahuas purchased seven hundred head from
their individual monies. As a result of natural increase the herd
numbered 3160 head at the end of 1917 and was worth twenty
percent over the original purchase price. 60 Additional improvements at White Tail included storage sheds, cisterns, gardens, root
cellars and fencing, and, according to Light, "other indications of
general prosperity. "61
Manifestations of well-being to the contrary, Asa Daklugie and
Eugene Chihuahua, members of the Mescalero Business Committee, advised the Indian Office that "we just barely get along."
Referring to a portion of the Chiricahuas' individual Fort Sill cattle monies reinvested in Herefords at Mescalero, Daklugie and
Chihuahua said that "what money we had when we came to this
reservation has been spent for . . . good purpose." Since they
were in dire need of food and clothing, inasmuch as there was no
"means of employment or any regular work to be given us," these
individuals desired to know what became of the General Apache
Fund. After all, "this money we sweat and work hard for" they
earned it "honestly when [we] were prisoners of war." Daklugie
and Chihuahua believed that improvements on the reservation
ought to be funded by Congress. 62
Difficulties confronting the Chiricahuas were compounded due
to a severe drought experienced during the spring of 1918. Especially hard hit again was the Chiricahuas' oat crop which was to
bring in desperately needed cash for "supplies of cornmeal, coffee,
sugar, clothing, harness, various repairs and utensils of necessity."
Of approximately 608 acres planted, less than seventy acres were
productive. This led Light to describe their crops as failures and
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express the fear they would "have very little to live upon.
Daklugie and Chihuahua described the situation in stronger
terms. "At the present time some of our number are existing upon
less than white people feed to their dogs." Exhaustion of individual resources and credit at local stores did not improve matters. 63
Furthermore, the Chiricahuas were in need of barns, pumps for
a number of their wells, a blacksmith to repair their implements, a
traction engine to thresh their oats and hospital facilities. Houses
erected only several years earlier were already in poor condition.
Indeed, by the end of 1918, houses had yet to be erected for several
Chiricahua families. Small wonder that Daklugie and Chihuahua
eXlJressed the sentiment that "we have been neglected and some of
the promises made by Government officials when we were liberated and placed on this reservation have not been kept. "64
Because these and similar conditions not only greatly disheartened the Chiricahuas 65 but also their Mescalero brethren, Asa
Daklugie and his Mescalero counterparts launched a vigorous
campaign which repeatedly urged Major General Scott, who had
just completed his term as Chief of Staff, to "please ask Congress
to give us its value and hold the timber so we can get homes and
stock our range; we need their help as we are a poor people
now. "66 Daklugie's entreaties eventually prompted Scott personally to ascertain conditions at Mescalero in his new capacity as a
member of the Board of Indian Commissioners. 67 Because the Chiricahuas were promised "that they would be put in as good an
economic condition as when they were at Fort Sill," said Scott,
these Indians came to Mescalero in 1913 "full of courage and
hope." Inasmuch as this guarantee remained unfulfilled, the Fort
Sill Apaches not only became greatl" discouraged over their
future at this reservation, but also had retrograded since coming
under Interior's jurisdiction. Relative to the proposed reimbursable cattle appropriation, which monies were designed to be
allocated on the basis of Mescalero's timber resources as security,
Scott maintained that "had action been taken at once these Indians would be on their feet."68 While at Mescalero, Scott
gathered the Chiricahuas together and "said 'I am sorry. I am
responsible for your people moving here.''' If any wished to
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return to Oklahoma, " 'I'll be glad to take you back.' " Although
several did return to Oklahoma, most "felt themselves committed
and said they would try to begin life anew at Mescalero."69
Ernest Stecker, who became the new agent at Mescalero in July
1919, was the major force behind the Chiricahuas' renewed efforts toward a brighter future. Stecker, who was quite familiar to
these Indians when they were at Fort Sill while he was Anadarko
Agency superintendent for the Kiowas and Comanches, boldly
produced a plan of economic development for the entire reservation. This project envisioned the sale of a minimum of 170,000,000 feet of timber valued at $500,000, the funds to be made
available on a reimbursable basis. At least half of these monies
would be invested so as to increase the cattle herd to six thousand
head. There would ensue a minimum yearly sale of 4500 yearlings
yielding an annual income of approximately $180,000. 70
Yet, despite Stecker's efforts to attain this goal, there passed
another three years before any positive action was obtained on this
matter. Almost immediately Stecker's plan was confronted with
severe political opposition. In turn, this caused the Indian Office
to be more than reluctant in expressing its support for Stecker's
proposal-so much so that the agent found himself constrained, in
the course of urging support for his program, to advise General
Scott that he had "no confidence in Mr. Sells." Fortunately, Scott
succeeded in his attempts at pressuring Interior to sign the
necessary timber confract. By the end of 1920, one battle remained to be won as Congress had yet to allocate the reimbursable
funding for this project. 71
Yet opposition forces in Congress also could claim jl partial victory. When the funding request for Stecker's proposal reached
Congress on January 7, 1921, only $250,000 in reimbursable
funds was solicited. 72 Despite Scott's persistent pressure to have
these monies made available, due to a short congressional session
this appropriation failed to pass. 73 "After many years of disappointment," said Roger Toclanny and Charles Martine, the Chiricahua members of the Mescalero Indian Business Committee, "it
now seems as though our wish for better living conditions is to be
realized." They, as well as other members of this organization,
decided to pressure government officials in order to ensure that
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such prospects might be fully realized. As such, they constantly
pleaded with Scott not to relax his vigilance on this issue. 74
Indeed, according to Fred C. Morgan; the newly arrived agent
at Mescalero, "unless funds are available from some source either
to give them work or to set them on their feet in the stock business
I anticipate that there will be many discouraged and hungry Indians before the problem is finally worked out." Otherwise, said
Morgan, he saw "very little hope of getting these Indians on their
feet at an early date."75 Fortunately, the agitation exercised on
behalf of these Indians began to produce favorable results. By May
1922 legislation had been formulated for a $250,000 reimbursable appropriation designed "for the purpose of promoting
civilization and self-support among the Indians of the Mescalero
Reservation in New Mexico."76 In the course of conference nego'tiations, funding for this item was pared down to $75,000. Even
so, during the first quarter of 1923, mainly due to the relentless efforts expended by Scott in support of both the Chiricahuas and
Mescaleros, this measure became law. 77
With this development, Sam Kenoi poignantly expressed these
Indians' appreciation for Scott's endeavors on this issue. "Dear
General accept our sincere thanks. There has," said Kenoi, "been
much really great suffering here" among the Chiricahuas and
Mescaleros. "With some of this appropriation available for immediate relief our suffering oU'ght soon to be at an end." Kenai
promised that, "in our better times, when we are able to have at
least the necessities of life," each "Indian will think of General
Scott through whose efforts the much needed relief has come."
Kenai again hoped that Scott would accept the heartfelt gratitude
of "these Apaches at Mescalero whom you have so often helped in
a fatherly way. . . ."78
Thus, after a ten-year period of gross 'neglect by the Bureau of
Indian Affairs, a small beginning was made toward fulfilling the
promises made to the Chiricahuas in 1913 when they left Fort Sill
for Mescalero. As matters stood, the $ 75,000 reimbursable appropriation would only provide for a portion of the much needed cat, tIe with which to stock the reservation. They continued to be in
need of better housing, and "barns and sheds for. . . their stock
and farming utensils," for which purpose funds had to come from
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some other source since the "Indians are without funds to do this
work. "79 Years would pass before the Chiricahuas again experienced anything close to the degree of prosperity they attained at
Fort Sill. Had the Indian Office been not only less concerned with
political expedience regarding Fall's national park scheme, but
also more willing to place the Chiricahuas on a plane of economic
self-sufficiency by making available to them the General Apache
Fund and pressing Congress for the reimbursable cattle appropriation at the very least, these Indians would not have been plunged
into destitution. Had their rations not been summarily cut off, the
Fort Sill Apaches, who certainly deserved better treatment, would
not have been forced to starve. As such, the economic distress experienced by the former Chiricahua Apache prisoners of war is illustrative of an outrage perpetrated upon a people whose saga was
already surfeited with abundant injustices.
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